

“The military will never stay in the barracks until other institutions have developed enough credibility to counter the army’s.”

## Pakistan’s Security-Governance Challenge

C. CHRISTINE FAIR

During the cold war, security was understood largely in state-centric terms of military security, which included a state’s ability to defend its borders, people, and supreme national interests. Since the cold war ended, security increasingly has been conceived in terms of individuals, with greater focus on a state’s ability to provide its citizens with security—political, economic, social, or environmental.

The scholarly discourse on both security and governance is well developed, but the concept of “security-sector governance” has received less attention. In a country like Pakistan, this is particularly a problem because, as the analyst Salma Malik has observed, Pakistan has conspicuously failed to rise to the challenges of security governance.

The political scientist Heiner Hänggi suggests that, at the state level, “security governance” refers to both the organization and the management of a state’s security sector—a sector that includes the armed forces, intelligence agencies, the judiciary, and all institutions that develop, promulgate, and oversee both internal and external security. At a crude level, democratic control of these institutions might indicate “good security governance,” while military rule would likely signal “poor security governance.”

South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular have yet to recognize fully the importance of security-sector governance as a central element in state legitimacy, domestically and internationally. In Pakistan the impact of this failure, on the country and its polity, is quite significant.

At the state level, the Pakistani military has set national security policy, either directly or indi-

rectly, since independence in 1947. Pakistan has increasingly become a security state locked in an intractable security competition with India. This has resulted in four wars (1947–48, 1965, 1971, 1999) and, since 1989, a protracted proxy war over the disputed Kashmir region. Pakistan is also involved in a less intense but equally important conflict with Afghanistan, which rejects the border separating the two countries.

The Pakistani army and its intelligence agencies have supported numerous Islamist militant groups that help prosecute the country’s policies in Afghanistan, India, and beyond. And Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella has enabled Islamabad’s increased use of these militant groups. Meanwhile, the army has perpetuated competition with India in part to demonstrate that it is the only institution capable of defending Pakistan. This in turn has allowed the military to demand without question resources from the state, which continues to underinvest in human development and even in domestic security agencies.

Pakistan and its citizens suffer not only from fundamental insecurity but also from serious deficiencies in governance capacity. The government does not exercise full sovereignty over all of its territory. It is incapable both of enforcing the writ of the law (putting aside how problematic the laws might be) and of exercising hegemony of force consistently throughout the country. The consequences of these twin dilemmas—insecurity and poor governance—are staggering.

According to statistics from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Pakistan’s 2009 defense expenditures were about \$4.8 billion, or 2.9 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. Its active military personnel number 650,000, with another 528,000 in the military reserve and 302,000 in paramilitary units. That is about 8 military personnel per 1,000 citizens. In neighboring India, which has a much larger

---

C. CHRISTINE FAIR is an assistant professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies and a former senior political scientist with the Rand Corporation. She is the author of *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan* (United States Institute of Peace, 2008).

military, there are 4 military personnel per 1,000 people.

While Pakistan has made consistent investments in its armed forces, it has neglected investments in its citizens' human development. The country's illiteracy rate is 37 percent for men and 64 percent for women, with an average of seven years of education for all Pakistanis. Pakistan is ranked 153rd of 186 countries in terms of the percentage of its GDP that is allocated to education. Its unemployment rate is (underestimated at) 15 percent, and there is significant underemployment.

The country has also failed to make needed investments in its internal security apparatus. While Pakistani militants have ravaged the region for decades, the country's own domestic threats are also numerous and enduring. Insurgent, terrorist, and criminal groups have killed countless Pakistanis since the state was formed. And because of under-resourced police, a deficient criminal justice system, and the cold fact that the state continues to nurture elements of the very militant groups that have savaged it (due to these groups' supposed utility against India and Afghanistan), no relief is in sight.

When one examines the prospects for security governance in Pakistan and the reforms that are needed to make such governance effective, not everything is negative. The country has taken important steps in securing its nuclear weapons, though the arsenal remains well outside civilian control. The state has also made strides in disaster management since a devastating earthquake hit Kashmir in 2005. Still, the challenges and impediments to genuine security governance in Pakistan today overshadow these limited improvements.

## SECURING THE ARSENAL

Pakistan animates the worst fears in the West. It is a nuclear-armed state with a well-known history of nuclear proliferation, a long track record of supporting Islamist militants, and a domestic Islamist insurgency that has wreaked havoc since 2004. This complex of conundrums has prompted some observers to speculate that the Pakistani army—or a rogue faction thereof—might willingly provide nuclear weapons to terrorists. Others worry that the terrorists will manage to infiltrate

the country's nuclear infrastructure and abscond with devices or radioactive material.

In fact, as the security analyst Christopher Clary and others have argued, such doomsday scenarios generally lack a basis in reality and fail to reflect important progress that Pakistan has made in securing its nuclear arsenal. Even so, continued vigilance is critical.

In 1998 Jehangir Karamat, then the army chief of staff, appointed Khalid Kidwai, then a major general, to head a newly formed Evaluation and Research Cell, according to Clary. That group recommended that a number of nuclear command and control arrangements be established, including: a National Command Authority (NCA) to be composed of both military and civilian leadership; a specialized secretariat to support the NCA; and specialized strategic forces. Following Karamat's abrupt dismissal in 1998 and the appointment of General Pervez Musharraf as army chief, the NCA finally came into being in 2000, along with the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), to serve as the secretariat of the NCA as well as of service-specific strategic forces.

The SPD is charged with protecting Pakistan's strategic assets both from internal and external threats. It provides a three-tiered security perimeter of nuclear facilities, which includes

physical countermeasures, the investigation and monitoring of personnel, and counterintelligence teams to identify potential threats. (After all, the Pakistanis reason, if terrorists could breach security, so could intelligence operatives from India, Israel, or even the United States.)

Pakistan has also undertaken measures to protect against the accidental use of nuclear arms, namely the equivalent of a "two-man rule," and some crude but functional versions of "permissive action links" (devices intended to prevent accidental or unauthorized arming or use of a nuclear weapon).

Yet, despite these improvements—made in the wake of the fiasco involving the nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, who admitted in 2004 to having sold nuclear technology to a number of countries—the challenges are considerable. According to Clary, Lieutenant General Kidwai, now retired from the army but still heading the SPD, has estimated that some 70,000 people work in Pakistan's nuclear complexes. Among them are 7,000 to 8,000 sci-

---

*The government is incapable of exercising hegemony of force consistently throughout the country.*

---

entists, of whom perhaps 2,000 possess critical knowledge.

Even the United States has lost fissile materials; and in 2007 several nuclear warheads were inappropriately loaded onto aircraft that flew over US airspace. Pakistan's infrastructure for nuclear weapons security is still new, compared to the better-established American systems. Meanwhile, deployment in wartime also raises questions. How can the two-man rule be operationalized when the missiles are armed and forward deployed? Also, as part of its deterrence strategy, Pakistan deliberately maintains ambiguity regarding the "redlines" that would precipitate nuclear escalation.

## FACING DISASTER

In 2005, a massive 7.6-magnitude earthquake struck Pakistan, mostly in Azad Kashmir (the portion of Kashmir administered by Pakistan) and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK). It killed 73,000 people and devastated homes and communities along the fault line. Pakistan proved woefully underprepared to manage the crisis.

Following a considerable effort to draw lessons from that tragedy and from the state's management of it, Pakistan established the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in March 2007. Since then, the NDMA has become increasingly effective. In August 2010, the country was again visited by natural disaster, this time a monsoon-related super-flood. The floodwaters covered more than one-fifth of Pakistan's arable land, the equivalent of the entire US eastern seaboard. It displaced more than 20 million people and destroyed over a million homes. Crops and fields were devastated and millions of livestock perished.

This calamity affected more people than Hurricane Katrina, the Indian Ocean tsunami, and the Haiti earthquake combined. Miraculously, fewer than 2,000 people died, and most of them died in the early days of the deluge, before the government could act to prevent further loss of life.

Many observers at the time worried that the flood augured political instability, a wave of disease-related death, food insecurity, and economic devastation. However, more than half a year later, these fears have not materialized. The NDMA, along with provincial disaster management agencies and international donors, coordinated and sustained a massive effort to rescue flood victims. They established camps for internally displaced people and provided victims with shel-

ter, sanitation facilities, water, food, basic medical care, vaccines, and other requirements.

Despite the gravity of the floods, most of the displaced people have returned home, according to the NDMA. However, nearly 160,000 of the original 3 million remain in camps. And Lieutenant General Nadeem Ahmed, who heads the NDMA, concedes that many of the homes to which people have returned are temporary.

One of the key institutions that helped save lives in Pakistan during the flood was the Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD), which among other things forecasts floods. In mid-July, the PMD had become concerned about an emerging confluence of weather systems. As the Indus waters began to rise, the PMD issued a warning about impending floods in KPK. Residents there were in disbelief and did not take advantage of the warning. This helps explain why most of the flood's 1,985 victims perished in KPK during the earliest days of the flood. PMD scientists were able to give Sindh at least two weeks' warning; this helped save lives as river waters swelled and surged southward.

Meanwhile, PMD scientists have raised an important—but unheeded—concern. After tracking monsoon rains for decades, they have observed that the center of precipitation is no longer in the Punjab; rather, over time, it has shifted north and west to KPK. They worry that Pakistan's current dam and flow infrastructure is inadequate for these new precipitation patterns. Consistent with the country's notorious failure to generate proactive policies, the PMD's concerns about the nation's infrastructure are not currently under review. Such issues come under the authority of the Water Resource and Power Development Agency, which is not renowned for its efficiency or alacrity.

## POLICING PAKISTAN

Pakistan is a security state. The army dominates the state and contends that it alone is the primary institution to defend the state's integrity. Unfortunately, Pakistan has since the earliest days of independence failed to address serious internal challenges that have imperiled citizens' security. These threats include Bengali, Baloch, Sindhi, and Muhajir ethno-nationalist separatist movements; sectarian and communal violence; and organized crime and banditry, among others.

In the aftermath of 9/11, following Pakistan's alliance with the United States in the latter's "global war on terror," the government began

launching military actions against militants in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Since 2004, several commanders of militant groups have undertaken operations against the Pakistani state. A number of these commanders by late 2007 had coalesced under the putative leadership of Baitullah Mehsud and his Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, or Pakistani Taliban). While insurgent violence has mostly been concentrated in Pakistan's provincial capitals, several rural districts in Swat, southern Punjab, and central Baluchistan are also violence-prone, as is the rugged FATA region.

Yet, despite a persistent and growing internal security challenge, Pakistan's police remain horribly trained, poorly equipped, and outmanned and outgunned by the various foes they confront. In December 2010, during visits to police headquarters in Peshawar, Islamabad, and Lahore, I found that even the heads of provincial and federal police forces lack armored vehicles. The police—with a few extraordinary exceptions—are poorly paid considering the risks they take. This creates incentives for corruption, and in some cases (such as in Swat before 2009), police defected from their posts when militants were poised to overrun them, or when they or their families were threatened.

While the international community lavishes the army with F-16 fighter aircraft and other desired equipment, as well as financial largesse, Pakistan's police predominantly remain equipped with .303 bolt action rifles. They lack even the most basic body armor, and they travel in vulnerable soft-skin vehicles. Police stations and training facilities are a steady target of terrorists, yet most police infrastructure lacks the most elementary hardening to protect it against such attacks. Police officers are poorly trained and often barely literate. They lack even the crudest forms of forensics capability. And, on account of their avarice and propensity for extortion, they generally are loathed by the people they are supposed to serve.

It should be noted that some improvements have been made. Both the Punjab and KPK have increased police pay, expanded the force, equipped select units with modern light and heavy weapons, and acquired better—though still inadequate—ground mobility and communications equipment. The Islamabad police have made important strides

in professionalizing the forces and have won back the confidence of residents. The well-paid and well-disciplined Motorway Police are respected for their integrity and professionalism. However, these are rare exceptions to the overall decrepitude of the policing system.

Not only has Pakistan demurred from making critical investments in police forces, but the state has also failed miserably to provide a modern policing framework. Until 2002, Pakistan still operated under the Police Act of 1860—a colonial-era dispensation that was used to control citizens rather than protect them. President Musharraf's Police Order of 2002 was an important move to professionalize the police and remove them from the influence of politicians, who had become accustomed to using the police to execute their personal agendas. But when the parliament convened in 2002, it undermined some of the ordinance's most important measures pertaining to the political neutrality of the police force.

In the years since, Pakistan's national and state assemblies as well as the various police forces have been unable to agree on a concept of policing for a modern state. Without such a framework, there will be limits to the improvements that can be made in training, equipping, and professionalizing the police.

Pakistan has many advocates for robust police reform within its various policing institutions. However, they lament that they cannot attract the attention they need from the country's legislative bodies. The police also report conflicts with the army and intelligence agencies. These conflicts take several forms. Reports abound that police arrest individuals suspected of being terrorists only to be told that these persons must be released, due to the interference of the "agencies." Meanwhile, it is likely that the army is at best ambivalent about making widespread improvements in policing, if for no other reason than that the army enjoys its preeminent status among Pakistan's institutions.

This is shortsighted. The literature on insurgency generally suggests that local police—not armies—prevail in counterinsurgencies. Meanwhile, maintaining the army's operational tempo in internal security duties over a long period will likely have negative effects on army morale and erode the institution's relations with

---

*Pakistan's police remain horribly  
trained, poorly equipped,  
outmanned, and outgunned.*

---

the citizenry. Unfortunately, there are few signs that Pakistan is taking its policing challenge seriously, and its international partners have largely failed to provide comprehensive assistance to the police forces.

### SHAKY LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The police are also hobbled by Pakistan's derelict criminal justice system, which—with a conviction rate that the International Crisis Group pegs at between 5 and 10 percent—in most cases acquits the accused. Pakistanis arrested in extremely high-profile attacks routinely go free, such as suspects in the 2007 attack on Benazir Bhutto in Karachi, the 2008 Danish embassy and Marriott Hotel bombings in Islamabad, and the 2009 assault on the Lahore police training academy. Even those accused of the 2009 attack on army headquarters in Rawalpindi were acquitted.

This demoralizes the police, who are often incapable of assembling a file of evidence adequate to persuade a judge to convict. The effort is made more difficult because the police generally do not know how to preserve a crime scene, collect evidence properly, or maintain custodial chains of evidence. Pakistan also widely lacks capabilities to analyze ballistics, DNA, or other common forms of forensic evidence.

Furthermore, the country has no witness protection program. Given the limited police capabilities, witnesses are critical. Yet witnesses fear putting their lives at risk. Witnesses are not alone; many judges may be afraid to convict. (In the case of blasphemy charges, the opposite holds: Judges may fear for their lives if they acquit.) Prosecutors are also sensitive to personal risk in deciding to take up cases. For these and other reasons, police resort to extralegal means to deal with suspects, such as killing them in “encounters.”

In fact, as the International Crisis Group has reported, Pakistan's criminal justice system is flawed from first principles—the legislative framework. The criminal law draws from three colonial-era laws. These include the Pakistan Penal Code of 1860, the Evidence Act of 1872, and the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. Pakistan has also retained the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901, which places the FATA under a different regulatory framework, one based on a system of political agents who serve as judges, prosecutors,

and law enforcement, and who operate on the principle of collective punishment. Residents of the FATA have no appellate recourse should they feel aggrieved by a political agent's decision.

Since 2009, parts of KPK (for example, Malakand and Swat) have been subject to the Nizam-e-Adl, an act approved by the central government that enforces an idiosyncratic interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) through courts staffed with judges (*qazis*) who are appointed by the KPK government. The controversial law arose out of negotiations with the provincial government and Maulana Sufi Muhammad, the chief of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi, a local ally of the Pakistani Taliban.

Critics see the law as a serious concession to domestic Islamist militants. However, the law has its proponents as well. The “qazi courts” must adjudicate civil cases within six months and criminal cases within four months. Many Malakand residents seem happy with the expeditious way in which cases are now dispensed, compared to the lethargic system that existed before. But oppo-

nents argue that the best remedy to dissatisfaction with the status quo is wholesale reform of the national justice system, rather than idiosyncratic provincial “solutions” that undermine the writ of the law.

In addition to these geographically peculiar laws, several other laws have been enacted that are germane to Pakistan's security governance. The notorious Hudood Ordinances, passed in 1979 under then-President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, enforce physical punishment for a wide array of crimes and equate being raped (without witnesses) with other forms of “unlawful fornication,” all of which are punishable by stoning or death. (These ordinances were modestly reformed with the Women's Protection Act of 2006, according to which women who fail to prove they were raped can no longer be charged with extramarital fornication.)

Pakistan's laws include a controversial blasphemy statute that allows persons to be charged as blasphemers with virtually no evidence. If a suspect is found guilty, the penalty is death. Also, then-President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto forged legislation in 1971 that declared Ahmadis to be “non-Muslim.” Pakistan is home to an estimated 2 million members of this sectarian offshoot of Islam. Bhutto's law, which criminalized the group's

---

*The state continues to nurture elements of the very militant groups that have savaged it.*

---

claim to be Muslim, has been used to provide cover for widespread discrimination and even violence against Ahmadis.

Other security-related laws on the books include the National Accountability Ordinance of 1999, which purportedly aimed at corruption but has been used selectively to pursue Pakistanis who antagonize the government. In addition, the recently lapsed Antiterrorism Act of 1997 provided special courts and provisions for detaining and trying suspected terrorists.

Not only is Pakistan's legal framework ill suited for a modern state beset with complex law-and-order challenges, but the system of courts and prisons suffers from serious problems. According to the International Crisis Group, more than 177,000 cases were pending in the superior courts (the Supreme Court, the provincial high courts, and the Federal Shariat Court) and 1.3 million in the lower judiciary at the beginning of 2010. The numbers of court personnel are too low to manage this system. Like civil servants everywhere in Pakistan, judicial officers are poorly paid and amenable to bribery.

Prisons are overcrowded, with about 80 percent of the prison population composed of suspects facing trial. Not only is this a serious concern for due process; it is also a security risk. Prisons are in fact logistical operational hubs for terrorists and organized criminals, who operate efficiently and with impunity from the safety of their jail cells. From jail, they use their mobile phones to plan and coordinate operations, and prisons provide ready pools of potential recruits. Prison staffs, whose numbers are insufficient, are unwilling to engage in countermeasures.

This situation is exacerbated by a surprising paucity of trained trial lawyers. Since lawyers are the pool from which judges are drawn, the problem percolates throughout the justice system, with no palliative in sight.

Comprehensive reforms are needed, beginning with revamping the legal framework; investing in a modern policing force; investing in lawyer training; reorganizing judicial recruitment and appointments at the lower and superior levels; and working to stem the institutionalized corruption that extends throughout the country's rule-of-law system.

## THE MILITARY AND THE MILITANTS

Even under the best-case scenario, Pakistan would be challenged to contend with these

security-governance matters. The country is a security state that has consistently failed to develop the kind of constitutional democracy that would empower citizens to take part in the conduct of the government's affairs at home and abroad. Moreover, problems are compounded by the internal and external agendas of the military and supporting intelligence agencies.

Motivated by neuralgic fears of India and by a desire to wrest Kashmir from their neighbor, Pakistan's army and intelligence agencies have long cultivated Islamist proxies for covert operations, beginning in 1947 in Kashmir and India and starting about 1960 in Afghanistan. Pakistan's ability to nurture Islamist militants was bolstered by a convulsion of nearly simultaneous events that included the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan, and Zia ul-Haq's own efforts to make Pakistan a Sunni Islamist state.

Pakistan, having supported thousands of Islamist militants for use against the Soviets in Afghanistan, was able to reallocate these battle-hardened fighters to the Kashmir and Indian theaters once the Soviets retreated. Pakistan was further emboldened to do this as it developed a covert nuclear capability beginning in the mid-1980s and an overt nuclear capability in 1998.

After Pakistan joined the US-led war on terror (admittedly, it had little choice but to do so), it was forced to alter some of its preferred policies. In 2001, it had to abandon the Afghan Taliban publicly and enable American military operations that first ousted the Taliban and then assembled a regime to replace them. From at least 2004, however, Pakistan resumed its clandestine support of the Afghan Taliban.

Meanwhile, following a 2001 attack on the Indian parliament by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), a Pakistani terrorist group adhering to Deobandi Islam—and because of the subsequent Indo-Pakistani military crisis, which undermined US operations in Afghanistan—Washington prevailed on Pakistan to reduce its support for militant groups operating in Kashmir and India. This became known as Musharraf's "moderated jihad" policy. The result of these various policies is that several militant groups, mostly under the Deobandi umbrella, began mobilizing against the state. This was most evident in 2007, when the TTP coalesced.

Analysts have tended to characterize the TTP as Pashtun (the ethno-linguistic group settled main-

ly in Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan), but in fact the Pakistani Taliban draw support from a wide spectrum of Deobandi militant groups, such as the anti-Shiite groups Lashkar-e-Jhangvi/Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and JM, many of whose members are from the Punjab, as well as from KPK, Sindh, Baluchistan, and Azad Kashmir. Generally, the disparate commanders of the TTP seek to challenge the writ of the Pakistani government and establish archipelagos governed by their personal interpretation of sharia. However, some commanders (for example, Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan) are allied to the Pakistani state and focus their efforts on helping the Afghan Taliban.

Pakistan's armed forces have used a variety of approaches to counter the militants who have carried out a campaign of suicide bombings against state targets throughout the country. The army has pursued peace deals with some groups—but has also taken military action when these deals were violated or when militants proved irreconcilable.

In any case, Pakistan's armed forces cannot deal comprehensively with this domestic threat as long as they continue to treat militancy as a tool of foreign policy. For example, the army has worked out an incremental strategy of killing radicalized militants when they attack the Pakistani military in KPK or the FATA, while permitting groups like JM to flourish as long as they remain in Punjab, loyal to the state and ready to kill Indians.

The Ahl-e-Hadith Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is a special case altogether. This Islamist militant organization, widely regarded as responsible for November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, has launched strikes in India and Kashmir, but has never attacked the Pakistani state or any targets within Pakistan. Generally LeT's leadership and most of its cadres remain loyal to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and argue against sectarian and communal killing. The group contends, rather, that every Pakistani Muslim should fight *kufars* (unbelievers) outside Pakistan.

LeT's pro-state message serves as an important counter to the Deobandis' predilection for targeting Shiites, Barelvīs (or Sufis), and Ahmadis, as well as the military, intelligence services, and civilians. Because of LeT's domestic and external utility, Pakistan is unlikely to turn against it even

though Washington is increasingly adamant that Islamabad do so.

Pakistan not only lacks security but also suffers severe deficiencies in governance capacity. Because Pakistanis are denied a voice in the future of their state, and seem ever more vulnerable to natural disasters as well as to criminal and terrorist activities, the notion of security governance could hardly be a more pressing issue for the country, its citizenry, and the international community.

## INTERNATIONAL OPTIONS

The international community has largely focused on the Pakistani armed forces as the locus of cooperation in security matters. It does pay increasing (yet still tentative) attention to civil-military relations. But Pakistan's international partners have not persuaded government officials of the urgency of the need to comprehensively improve security governance. International partnering has not given priority to expanding Pakistani institutions' capacity to govern effectively, much less transparently.

US and other international policy makers should reconsider their understanding of Pakistan's security needs and focus on investments and capacity building within the bureaucracy; on improving the provincial and national assemblies' ability to legislate; and on providing technical assistance and incentives to consolidate important gains made in disaster management and nuclear security. Also, international policy makers should move consistently and decisively toward encouraging and enabling Pakistan to improve its criminal justice system, reform its archaic legislative framework, and build modern and capable police forces.

The military will never stay in the barracks until other institutions have developed enough credibility to counter the army's. Unfortunately, this fact may motivate the army to undermine efforts by Pakistan's partners to improve security governance. Therefore, the international community should steadfastly condition its security assistance on the army's non-intrusion into government affairs. International donors must be willing to prioritize investments in Pakistan's civilian institutions, which are likely the only investments that offer any promise of long-term stability. ■